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Abstract
In this paper I analyse the impact of public expenditure and income
taxation on intergenerational inequality for seventeen countries. Age
group Gini index is calculated by using data from the Luxemburg Income
Study (LIS). Results are very robust in demonstrating that only income
taxation is able to inuence the level of intergenerational inequality, since
it directly a¤ects the wealth of households. Otherwise, public expenditure
seems to have no impact on individualswelfare, even if we consider pub-
lic expenditure components which should be tailored for specic cohorts.
Di¤erent hypotheses on standard errors are considered, in order to detect
the presence of one-way or two-way xed e¤ects.
Keywords : Age group inequality, Public Expenditure, Income Taxa-
tion
JEL Classi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1 Introduction
All modern democracies use scal policies in order to achieve redistribution
goals. A common belief taken from the optimal theory of taxation a¢ rms that
a better income distribution may be achieved via a system where income tax
paid as a fraction of before-tax income increases somewhat with income. Nev-
ertheless, even though statutory schedules are revised from time to time, the
stylised facts show that in Britain and America, "from the 1970s to the 1990s
inequality rose in both countries" and "redistribution toward the poor tends
to happen least in those times and polities where it would seem most justied
by the usual goal of welfare policy" (Lindert (2000)). Other evidence which
shows an increasing level of inequality within industrialized countries was found
by Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000). Finally, a comprehensive study made by
the United Nations (WIDER 2000) demonstrated that a recent increase in in-
equality has taken place in several countries such as Australia, United Kingdom,
United States, Chile, Peru, Bangladesh, China, Philippines and Poland. As a
result, it seems that redistribution and equity goals are far from being reached
even in more industrialised countries.
There is a huge amount of literature which studies the impact of scal policy
on macroeconomic variables. For example, Fatás and Mihov (2001) demonstrate
the existence of a signicant e¤ect of scal policies on consumption and em-
ployment, while Giavazzi et al. (1999) detected the presence of casual e¤ects on
savings. Otherwise, no signicant e¤ects were discovered between scal policies
and output (Tsoukalas, 2008).
Otherwise, the impact of scal policies on income distribution is less studied,
although there are some authors who have started to ll this gap. For instance,
an empirical study by Afonso et al. (2008) for a set of OECD countries adopts a
non-parametric approach to assess the e¢ ciency of public spending in promoting
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more equalization of income and nds that redistributive public spending has a
signicant e¤ect on income distribution.
Of course one may always think that inequality is originated by factors
which have nothing to do with the government intervention as, for example, the
inheritance of tangible and nancial wealth or individual talent (Huggett and al.,
2007). Nevertheless, it is indubitable that Governments can undertake several
actions to a¤ect householdsspending power, such as the control of prices and
rents. One way or another, the literature on income inequality has been focusing
on studying the issues related to income distribution at a macroeconomic level.
In this paper instead I analyse the impact of public expenditure and income
taxation on intergenerational inequality for seventeen countries. Age group Gini
index is calculated by using data from the Luxemburg Income Study (LIS). To
the best of my knowledge this is the rst study which calculates age group
inequality indices and assesses the impact of scal policies on the welfare of
di¤erent generations. The econometric framework is designed in order to al-
low for di¤erent hypotheses on standard errors, aiming to detect the presence
of one-way or two-way idiosyncratic components among clusters. The use of
two-way xed e¤ects, obtained by clustering data by country and age group, is
certainly not standard in the econometrics literature. Results are very robust in
demonstrating that income taxation is able to inuence the level of intergener-
ational inequality, since it directly a¤ects the wealth of households. Otherwise,
public expenditure seems to have no impact on individualswelfare, even if we
consider public expenditure components which should be tailored for specic
cohorts, such as pensions or childcare supports.
The paper is organised as follows: section two introduces some basic concepts
and tools used in the income inequality measurement and focuses on age group
inequality. Section three describes the database based on the Luxemburg Income
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Study and the econometric technique used. Section four describes the main
results and section ve concludes.
2 Measuring income inequality at a microeco-
nomic level
We now have all the elements to measure how groupswelfare is a¤ected by the
decisions taken by self-interested candidates who choose their taxation policy
in order to maximise the probability of winning elections. The goal of this
section is twofold: measuring the di¤erence in the level of inequality amongst
age groups and analysing the relation between this inequality and the structure
of taxations systems. To the best of my knowledge this is the rst attempt to
measure the cohort-specic inequality and the rst time that the Gini index is
disaggregated at a microeconomic level in order to capture in a more precise way
the di¤erences in inequality amongst social groups. In other words, I suggest
that the Gini index measured at a macroeconomic level to capture the general
inequality levels of countries, is the result of many Gini indexes calculated at
a microeconomic level. Calculating Gini indexes at a microeconomic levels
allows us to evaluate more precisely the impact of the Governments policies
on groupswelfare, something which cannot be made by using the Gini index
calculated at a country level.
The question addressed is: which are the age groups which are a­ icted by
the highest degree of inequalitity? In order to answer this question we must
remember that inequality measurement is always an attempt to give meaning
to comparisons of income distributions in terms of criteria which may be derived
from ethical principles, appealing mathematical constructs or simple intuition
(Cowell, 2000). As a consequence, before measuring the level of inequality in
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practise it is necessary to dene the concepts, the ranking criteria and the indices
necessary to achieve our goal.
2.1 Distributional and Ranking concepts
I will denote by z the space of all univariate probability distributions with
support   <;x 2  represents a particular value of income and F 2 z one
of the possible income distribution. So F (x  ex) represents the proportion
of population with income less than ex. Furthermore dene x := inf () and
denote by z (%)  z a subset with given mean % : z 7! < given by
% (F ) :=
Z
xdF (x) (1)
and f : 0 7! < as a density function, supposed that F is continuous over
some intervals 0  . Furthermore, in order to compare distributions, I as-
sume the existence of a complete and transitive binary relation <Ion z, called
inequality ordering and represented by I : F 7! <, if the ordering is continuous.1
In order to compare distributions we also need some ranking criteria over z.
I use the notation <T to indicate the ranking induced by a comparison principle
T . Three possible situations arise:
Denition 1 For all F;G 2 z :
(a) (strict dominance) G T F , G <T F ^ F= <T G:
(b) (equivalence) G T F , G <T F ^ F <T G:
(c) (non-comparability) G ?T F , G= <T F ^ F= <T G:
Suppose now to focus on the concept of social-welfare function, expressed in
the following additively separable form:
1 I assume that axioms of Anonymity, Population Principle, Principle of Transfers,
Monotonicity, Scale Invariance, Decomposability, Uniform income growth and Translation
Invariance (Cowell, 2000) are satised.
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W (F ) =
Z
u (x) dF (x) (2)
where u : z 7! < is an evaluation function. Denote by W^1 the subclass
of SWFs where u is increasing and by W^2 the subclass of W^1 where u is also
concave. Furthermore, dene the set of age years A where a is a given age in
A. Finally, introduce the following
Denition 2 For all F 2 z, a 2 A and for all 0  q  1, the quantile
functional for a given age year is dened by
Q (F ; (q; a)) = inf fxjF (x)  q; ag = xqa (3)
This denition enables us to state the theorem of rst-order distributional
dominance
Theorem 3 G <Q F , W (G) W (F ) 8

W 2 W^1

Otherwise, if we consider this other
Denition 4 For all F 2 z, a 2 A and for all 0  q  1, the cumulative
income functional for a given age year is dened by
C (F ; (q; a)) :=
Z Q(F ;(q;a))
x
xdF (x) (4)
2
which leads us to the theorem of second-order distributional dominance
Theorem 5 8F;G 2 z (%) : G <C F , W (G) W (F ) 8

W 2 W^2

2The graph C (F ; q) against q describes the generalised Lorenz curve
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Suppose now that a distribution depends on the e¤ects of a policy p 2 P ,
where P is the space of all the possible policies. Without loss of generality, I
suppose that P =

p1; p2
	
. Suppose also that distribution F is obtained under
policy p1 and distribution G is obtained under policy p2. We may denote by
F = F
 
p1; a

and G = G
 
p2; a

the distribution obtained under the two policies
for a given age group a.
We want to dene a comparison criterion for judging policies and their e¤ects
on the distribution of age groups.
Theorem 6 (First-order distributional dominance) For all p1; p2 2 P , a 2 A :
p1 <Q p2 , W
 
F
 
p1; a
 W  G  p2; a 8W 2 W^1
Theorem 7 (Second-order distributional dominance) For all p1; p2 2 P , a 2 A;
F;G 2 z (%) : p1 <C p2 , W
 
F
 
p1; a
 W  G  p2; a 8W 2 W^2
These two theorems simply state that a policy q1 is preferred to policy q2 if
and only if the welfare obtained under the distribution it generates
is higher than the welfare obtained under the distribution generated
by the other policy for every age group. Notice that this condition must
hold for every age group; that means that we should see an improvement in wel-
fare of all cohorts.
2.2 Decomposition indices
The Generalised Entropy measure is the more suitable index to analyse inequal-
ity within and between groups because of its decomposability. It may be written
as
GE () =
within group inequalityz }| {Z
h
fh
xh
x

Ih () +
between group inequalityz }| {
Ibet () (5)
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where
Ibet () =
1
 (  1)
Z
h
fh
xh
x

  1

(6)
The  in ?? is a parameter that characterises di¤erent members of the
GE class: a high positive value of  yields an index that is very sensitive to
income transfers at the top of the distribution. In particular, GE (0) represents
the mean logarithmic deviation, GE (1) the Theil index, and GE (2) the half of
square of the coe¢ cient of variation.
Another useful indicator to measure the inequality between groups is repre-
sented by Gini:
G = 1 +
1
N
 

2
N2x
 Z
h
(N   h+ 1)xh

(7)
where N =
R
wh; wh = f
hN . When data are unweighted, wh = 1 and
N = H. Individuals are ranked in ascending order of h.
3 Empirical evidence from the Luxemburg In-
come Study
3.1 Dataset
The Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) is a panel database including 30 countries
and made by 5 waves of data from 1979 2002. The source of data is repre-
sented by country specic household income surveys. For example, individual
data from the United States are taken from the Current Population Survey.
Datasets are identied by a code made by two letters denoting a country and
two numbers which identify the wave of data. For instance, US00 identies
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the wave 2000 for the United States. In the analysis I used a reduced panel
of 17 countries (letters in brackets represent the LIS codes): Austria (AT),
Belgium (BE), Canada (CA), Czech Republic (CZ), Switzerland (CH), Germany
(DE), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR),
Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Israel (IL), Italy (IT), Luxemburg
(LU), Mexico (MX), Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Romania (RO),
Russia (RU), Slovak Republic (SK), Slovenia (SI), Sweden (SE), Taiwan (TW),
United Kingdom (UK) and United States (US).
The dataset includes data at both an individual and household level on
demographics, expenditure, income, labor market outcomes and tax variables.
Inequality indexes were calculated using the denition of disposable income,
calculated as follows:
disposable income = compensation of employees
+ gross self
 employment income
+ realised property income
+ occupational pensions3
+ other cash income4
+ social insurance cash transfers5
+ universal cash transfers6
+ social assistance7
3Occupational pensions include all pensions paid from non-social retirement schemes in-
cluding employer-based pensions for private sector workers and public employees.
4Other cash income includes regular private transfers, alimony and child support benets,
other sources of regular cash income, not classied above.
5Social insurance transfers include: accident or short-term disability pay, long-term dis-
ability pay, social retirement benets (old age and survivors), unemployment pay, maternity
allowances, military or veterans benes, other social insurance.
6Universal cash transfers include child and/or family allowances if paid directly by govern-
ments. Universal cash transfers paid as refundable income tax credits are counted as negative
amounts in the income tax of some countries.
7Social assistance includes all income-tested and means-tested benets, both cash and
near-cash.
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  direct taxes
  social security contributions.
This choice is natural because the disposable income allows us to assess the
impact of taxation on individualswelfare and thus to evaluate the degree of
inequality as a result of the candidateschoice.
3.2 Empirical Framework
In order to evaluate if and how the cohort-specic inequality depends upon the
structure of scal policies chosen by the Government I built an econometric
model where Gini indexes, calculated for every age group by using the Jenkins
routine, represent the dependent variable. The regressors are the variables which
capture the two sides of scal policies, taxation system and public expenditures
components, and some control variables, such as the GDP growth rate, the
unemployment rate and the consumer price index (CPI). The specication of
the model is the following:
gij = +
X
q
qtqj +
X
p
pcpj + "ij (8)
where i denotes the i-th generation, j the j-th country, gij the age group
Gini index calculated for year 2000, tqj the q-th scal policy for country j and
cpj the p-th control variable for country j. Since it is not easy to quantify how
long the e¤ects of a scal policy take to a¤ect individualswealth (the so called
transmission lag), I took the values of public expenditure components measured
for three years (1985, 1990 and 1995). Otherwise, we may reasonably assume
that taxation a¤ects directly and instantaneously the welfare of households,
which means that the transmission lag is particularly low.
I use many proxies to capture the two sides of scal policy, namely:
1. Public Expenditure
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 Old-age pensions, early retirement pensions, home-help and residential
services for the elderly;
 Health spending on in- and out-patient care, medical goods, prevention;
 Family child allowances and credits, childcare support, income support
during leave, sole parent payments;
 Active labour market policies Employment services, training youth mea-
sures subsidised employment, employment measures for the disabled;
 Housing housing allowances and rent subsidies.
2. Taxation
 ttw67 - total tax wedge as a 67% of Average Wage; marginal personal
income tax and social security contribution rates on gross labour income;
 ttw100 - total tax wedge as a 100% of Average Wage; marginal personal
income tax and social security contribution rates on gross labour income;
 ttw133 - total tax wedge as a 133% of Average Wage; marginal personal
income tax and social security contribution rates on gross labour income;
 ttw167 - total tax wedge as a 167% of Average Wage; marginal personal
income tax and social security contribution rates on gross labour income;
 attw67 - total tax wedge as a 67% of Average Wage; average personal
income tax and social security contribution rates on gross labour income;
 attw100 - total tax wedge as a 100% of Average Wage; average personal
income tax and social security contribution rates on gross labour income;
 attw133 - total tax wedge as a 133% of Average Wage; average personal
income tax and social security contribution rates on gross labour income;
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 attw167 - total tax wedge as a 167% of Average Wage; average personal
income tax and social security contribution rates on gross labour income;
 tmpit - top marginal personal income tax rates for employee (combined);
 nptdi - net personal Tax; overall statutory tax rates on dividend income.
I also consider two control variables:
 GDP Growth Rate, calculated for years;
 Consumer price index;
both calculated for years 1997, 1998 and1999.
The marginal and average tax rates "all-in" for employees include personal
income tax and employee social security contributions, less cash benets, for a
single individual without children at di¤erent income levels. Marginal tax rates
measure how much of the extra wage income an individual worker keeps after
taxes, whilst average tax rates measure how much total net income after tax
changes if an individual decides to join (or exit from) the labour market (OECD,
2004).
The taxation of personal capital income varies substantially amongst OECD
countries because some of them tax all personal capital income at a at rate and
wage and pensions at progressive rates (Dual-income tax). In other countries
the taxation is progressive and the capital is taxed at more or less the same
rates as labour (comprehensive income tax systems); nally in some countries
we observe a semi-dual income taxation of capital income, since some capital is
taxed at lower rates than wage income. Due to these di¤erences, the OECD has
chosen to use the taxation of dividends as a proxy for the taxation of capital,
in order to allow for comparability.
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3.2.1 Fixed e¤ects: one-way error component model
Regressions were performed by using di¤erent hypotheses on the error compo-
nents.
Following Baltagi (2008) I assume that observations could have unobserved
xed e¤ects. I initially assume that residuals consist of a generation specic
component i and an idiosyncratic component which is unique to each observa-
tion vij , independent and identically distributed IID
 
0; 2v

. That is
"ij = i + vij i = 1; :::; N ; j = 1; :::;M (9)
Secondly, I follow the same reasoning for the country specic component j
"ij = j + vij i = 1; :::; N ; j = 1; :::;M (10)
This produces White standard errors which are robust to within cluster
correlation (Clustered or Rogers standard errors). These standard errors would
allow observations in the same generation/country to be correlated (i.e. di¤erent
generations), but would assume that observations in the same generation, but
di¤erent countries (or vice versa), are assumed to be correlated. The residuals
are correlated across observations of the same generation, but are independent
across countries:
corr ("ij ; "ts) =
8>>>><>>>>:
1 for i = t ^ j = s
" =
2
2"
for i = t ^ 8 j 6= s
0 8 i 6= t
or correlated across observations of the same country, but are independent
across generations:
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corr ("ij ; "ts) =
8>>>><>>>>:
1 for i = t ^ j = s
" =
2
2"
for i 6= t 8 j = s
0 8 j 6= s
If " > 0 when the data have a xed generation e¤ect, the OLS standard
errors will underestimate the true standard error. It can be demonstrated (see
Petersen, 2006) that clustered standard errors are designed to correct the cor-
relation of the residuals within cluster.
3.2.2 Fixed e¤ects: two-way error component model
Secondly, I consider the regression model given by (8), but clustering data with
two-way error components disturbancies:
"ij = i + j + vij i = 1; :::; N ; j = 1; :::;M (11)
with i and j assumed as xed parameters to be estimated. This approach
allows for correlations among di¤erent generations in the same country and dif-
ferent countries in the same generation. The tqand cp are assumed independent
of the vij . Therefore we have
corr ("ij ; "ts) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
1 for i = t ^ j = s
" =
8><>:
2
2"
for i = t ^ 8 j 6= s
2
2"
for i 6= t ^ 8 j = s
0 for 8 j 6= s ^ 8 j 6= s
In matrix notation, (8) may be written as
G = I +D+D + T + C + " (12)
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where I is the identity matrix, D and D the dummy matrix for the gen-
eration and country e¤ects. The full least squares solution to the estimation
problem for equation (12) solves the following normal equations for all estimable
e¤ects:
266666666664
C 0C C 0T C 0 C 0 C 0T
T 0C T 0T T 0 T 0 T 0I
0C 0T 0 0 0I
0C 0T 0 0 0I
IC IT I I II
377777777775
266666666664





377777777775
=
266666666664
C 0G
T 0G
0G
0G
IG
377777777775
(13)
3.2.3 Random e¤ects
When the residuals are correlated within a cluster, not only are the OLS stan-
dard errors biased but the slope coe¢ cients are not e¢ cient. One method for
taking advantage of the additional information in the residuals (and generating
more e¢ cient estimates) is to estimate a random e¤ects model using a general-
ized least squares approach. In this case   IID (0; ) :
4 Analysis of Results
Tables 1-7 report the results of regressions. I summarised them in the following
six points:
[TABLE 1-7 HERE]
1. Tables 4-7 clearly show that the structure of taxation, captured by mar-
ginal and average personal income taxes, is strongly signicant in explaining
intergenerational inequality. These variables are almost always strongly signif-
icant at the 1 per cent of the condence interval. This is an intuitive result,
since taxation directly a¤ects the income of individuals;
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2. On the other hand, the components of public expenditure are not sig-
nicant, as Tables 1-3 show; variables are never signicant at the 5 per cent of
the condence interval. This is a counterintuitive result which goes against the
conventional wisdom that public expenditure contributes to reduce inequality;
3. Point 2 and 3, taken together, provide a very important policy suggestion
which is generated by the following asymmetry: it is the amount of money
subtracted to individuals which generates disparities, not the amount of money
they receive;
4. Average income taxes are more signicant than marginal income taxes;
this consideration comes out from the comparison between the parts (a) and (b)
of Tables 4-7;
5. Macroeconomic variables strongly inuence the level of intergenerational
inequality; from Tables 4-7 we may see that both CPI and GDP are almost
always strongly statistically signicant;
6. p-values are quite similar across approaches, especially between xed and
random e¤ects estimations.
5 Conclusions
This paper analyse the role played by scal policies on what I dened as age
group inequality. This work represents a rst attempt to move from the study
of the macroeconomic inequality to that of the microeconomic inequality, which
aims to detect di¤erences in income distribution between social groups. Re-
sults are robust in showing that taxation has immediate and direct e¤ects on
intergenerational inequality, whilst public expenditure components have not.
This study, of course, could be improved in many ways. For instance it is dif-
cult to disentangle the e¤ects generated by scal policies from those generated
by monetary policy, since we have to assume that the two instruments produce
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e¤ects on households. Secondly, it would be important to measure the age group
inequality by clustering according other variables, such as location, social status
and so on and so forth. I hope this could be done in future researches.
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Age group Gini index Coef. Std.Err. t P>t
family95 0.004605 0.021785 0.21 0.835
health95 -0.0065 0.00976 -0.67 0.515
housing95 0.004003 0.021047 0.19 0.852
labour_programme95 -0.0247 0.02357 -1.05 0.31
old_age95 -0.01192 0.006798 -1.75 0.099
const 0.46695 0.046772 9.98 0***
Age group Gini index Coef. Std.Err. t P>t
family90 0.001554 0.019585 0.08 0.938
health90 -0.00167 0.010998 -0.15 0.881
housing90 -0.00321 0.036059 -0.09 0.93
labour_programme90 -0.03393 0.034364 -0.99 0.338
old_age90 -0.01147 0.006789 -1.69 0.111
const 0.443228 0.056334 7.87 0***
Age group Gini index Coef. Std.Err. t P>t
family85 -0.0063 0.021778 -0.29 0.776
health85 -0.02126 0.012489 -1.7 0.109
housing85 0.018843 0.038721 0.49 0.634
labour_programme85 0.011648 0.033422 0.35 0.732
old_age85 -0.00349 0.008786 -0.4 0.697
const 0.458517 0.039882 11.5 0***
Table 1, (a) (b) (c): Fixed E¤ects regression with Robust Clustered
Standard Errors (RCSE) - Expenditure. Cluster: country (One-way Error
Component Model); (***) signicant at 1% C.I.; (**) signicant at 5% C.I.;
(*) signicant at 10% C.I.
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Age group Gini index Coef. Std.Err. t P>t
family95 0.004605 0.021573 0.21 0.831
health95 -0.0065 0.009615 -0.68 0.499
housing95 0.004003 0.020601 0.19 0.846
labour_programme95 -0.0247 0.023271 -1.06 0.289
old_age95 -0.01192 0.006758 -1.76 0.078*
const 0.46695 0.046647 10.01 0***
Age group Gini index Coef. Std.Err. t P>t
family90 15539 0.019448 0.08 0.936
health90 -0.00167 0.010905 -0.15 0.878
housing90 -0.00321 0.035397 -0.09 0.928
labour_programme90 -0.03393 0.03393 -1 0.318
old_age90 -0.01147 0.006737 -1.7 0.089*
const 0.443228 0.056497 7.85 0***
Age group Gini index Coef. Std.Err. t P>t
family85 -0.0063 0.021473 -0.29 0.769
health85 -0.02126 0.012626 -1.68 0.092*
housing85 0.018843 0.037873 0.5 0.619
labour_programme85 0.011648 0.033042 0.35 0.725
old_age85 -0.00349 0.008738 -0.4 0.69
const 0.458517 0.040338 11.37 0***
Table 2 (a) (b) (c): Fixed E¤ects Regression with Robust Clustered
Standard Errors (RCSE) - Expenditure. Cluster: country and generation
(Two-way Error Component Model); (***) signicant at 1% C.I.; (**)
signicant at 5% C.I.; (*) signicant at 10% C.I.
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Age group Gini index Coef. Std. Err. t P>t
family95 0.004583 0.021762 0.21 0.833
health95 -0.00663 0.009752 -0.68 0.497
housing95 0.003989 0.021009 0.19 0.849
labour_programme95 -0.02463 0.023543 -1.05 0.295
old_age95 -0.01186 0.006777 -1.75 0.08*
const 0.467187 0.046822 9.98 0***
Age group Gini index Coef. Std. Err. t P>t
family90 0.001556 0.019548 0.08 0.937
health90 -0.00192 0.010935 -0.18 0.86
housing90 -0.00335 0.036016 -0.09 0.926
labour_programme90 -0.03361 0.034266 -0.98 0.327
old_age90 -0.01137 0.006743 -1.69 0.092*
const 0.443686 0.056418 7.86 0***
Age group Gini index Coef. Std. Err. t P>t
family85 -0.00635 0.021722 -0.29 0.77
health85 -0.0213 0.012341 -1.73 0.084*
housing85 0.018893 0.038691 0.49 0.625
labour_programme85 0.011725 0.033165 0.35 0.724
old_age85 -0.00345 0.008714 -0.4 0.692
const 0.458513 0.039871 11.5 0***
Table 3, (a) (b) (c): Random-e¤ects GLS regression - Expenditure. Group
variable: generation i in country j
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Age group Gini index Coef. Std. Err. t P>t
ttw67 -0.20047 0.082481 -2.43 0.027**
ttw100 -0.19127 0.081404 -2.35 0.032**
ttw133 0.059009 0.120458 0.49 0.631
ttw167 -0.05639 0.041465 -1.36 0.193
tmpit 0.096988 0.058601 1.66 0.117
nptdi -0.00243 0.000492 -4.94 0***
cpi99 0.011996 0.004436 2.7 0.016**
cpi98 -0.02625 0.006118 -4.29 0.001***
cpi97 0.037592 0.006469 5.81 0***
gdpgr97 -0.01004 0.00819 -1.23 0.238
gdpgr98 0.016937 0.005002 3.39 0.004***
gdpgr99 -0.01479 0.007696 -1.92 0.073*
cons 0.478973 0.035225 13.6 0***
Age group Gini index Coef. Std. Err. t P>t
attw67 0.628184 0.340144 1.85 0.083*
attw100 -2.64326 0.703977 -3.75 0.002***
attw133 2.056846 0.718587 2.86 0.011**
attw167 -0.59488 0.294185 -2.02 0.06*
tmpit 0.19563 0.064955 3.01 0.008***
nptdi -0.00261 0.000408 -6.4 0***
cpi99 0.023905 0.003516 6.8 0***
cpi98 -0.04175 0.005192 -8.04 0***
cpi97 0.050312 0.007533 6.68 0***
gdpgr97 -0.02963 0.008291 -3.57 0.003***
gdpgr98 0.023136 0.002319 9.98 0***
gdpgr99 -0.00596 0.007915 -0.75 0.462
cons 0.467718 0.029121 16.06 0***
Table 4, (a) (b): Fixed E¤ects Regression with Robust Clustered Standard
Errors (RCSE) - Taxation. Cluster: country (One-way Error Component
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Model); (***) signicant at 1% C.I.; (**) signicant at 5% C.I.; (*) signicant
at 10% C.I.
Age group Gini index Coef. Std. Err. t P>t
ttw67 -0.20047 0.051357 -3.9 0***
ttw100 -0.19127 0.033771 -5.66 0***
ttw133 0.059009 0.047406 1.24 0.218
ttw167 -0.05639 0.031492 -1.79 0.078*
tmpit 0.096988 0.032788 2.96 0.004***
nptdi -0.00243 0.000166 -14.63 0***
cpi99 0.011996 0.003876 3.09 0.003***
cpi98 -0.02625 0.004136 -6.35 0***
cpi97 0.037592 0.002587 14.53 0***
gdpgr97 -0.01004 0.00409 -2.46 0.017**
gdpgr98 0.016937 0.002025 8.37 0***
gdpgr99 -0.01479 0.004422 -3.34 0.001***
cons 0.478973 0.016388 29.23 0***
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Age group Gini index Coef. Std. Err. t P>t
attw67 0.628184 0.232783 2.7 0.009***
attw100 -2.64326 0.469374 -5.63 0***
attw133 2.056846 0.48484 4.24 0***
attw167 -0.59488 0.246385 -2.41 0.019**
tmpit 0.19563 0.042712 4.58 0***
nptdi -0.00261 0.000143 -18.31 0***
cpi99 0.023905 0.004153 5.76 0***
cpi98 -0.04175 0.004844 -8.62 0***
cpi97 0.050312 0.004034 12.47 0***
gdpgr97 -0.02963 0.004118 -7.2 0***
gdpgr98 0.023136 0.002163 10.7 0***
gdpgr99 -0.00596 0.004085 -1.46 0.149
cons 0.467718 0.016106 29.04 0***
Table 5, (a) (b): Fixed E¤ects Regression with Robust Clustered Standard
Errors (RCSE) - Taxation. Cluster: generation (One-way Error Component
Model); (***) signicant at 1% C.I.; (**) signicant at 5% C.I.; (*) signicant
at 10% C.I.
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Age group Gini index Coef. Std. Err. t P>t
ttw67 -0.2005 0.08248 -2.43 0.015**
ttw100 -0.1913 0.0814 -2.35 0.019**
ttw133 -0.0564 0.04147 -1.36 0.174
ttw167 0.05901 0.12046 0.49 0.624
tmpit 0.09699 0.0586 1.66 0.098*
nptdi -0.0024 0.00049 -4.94 0***
cpi99 -0.01 0.00819 -1.23 0.22
cpi98 0.01694 0.005 3.39 0.001***
cpi97 -0.0148 0.0077 -1.92 0.055*
gdpgr97 0.03759 0.00647 5.81 0***
gdpgr98 -0.0263 0.00612 -4.29 0***
gdpgr99 0.012 0.00444 2.7 0.007***
cons 0.47897 0.03523 13.6 0***
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Age group Gini index Coef. Std. Err. t P>t
attw67 0.62818 0.34014 1.85 0.065*
attw100 -2.6433 0.70398 -3.75 0***
attw133 -0.5949 0.29418 -2.02 0.043**
attw167 2.05685 0.71859 2.86 0.004***
tmpit 0.19563 0.06496 3.01 0.003***
nptdi -0.0026 0.00041 -6.4 0***
cpi99 -0.0296 0.00829 -3.57 0***
cpi98 0.02314 0.00232 9.98 0***
cpi97 -0.006 0.00791 -0.75 0.451
gdpgr97 0.05031 0.00753 6.68 0***
gdpgr98 -0.0418 0.00519 -8.04 0***
gdpgr99 0.02391 0.00352 6.8 0***
cons 0.46772 0.02912 16.06 0***
Table 6, (a) (b): Random-e¤ects GLS regression - Taxation. Group
Variable: country ; (***) signicant at 1% C.I.; (**) signicant at 5% C.I.; (*)
signicant at 10% C.I.
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Age group Gini index Coef. Std. Err. t P>t
ttw67 -0.2005 0.05136 -3.9 0***
ttw100 -0.1913 0.03377 -5.66 0***
ttw133 -0.0564 0.03149 -1.79 0.073*
ttw167 0.05901 0.04741 1.24 0.213
tmpit 0.09699 0.03279 2.96 0.003***
nptdi -0.0024 0.00017 -14.63 0***
cpi99 -0.01 0.00409 -2.46 0.014**
cpi98 0.01694 0.00202 8.37 0***
cpi97 -0.0148 0.00442 -3.34 0.001***
gdpgr97 0.03759 0.00259 14.53 0***
gdpgr98 -0.0263 0.00414 -6.35 0***
gdpgr99 0.012 0.00388 3.09 0.002***
cons 0.47897 0.01639 29.23 0***
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Age group Gini index Coef. Std. Err. t P>t
attw67 0.62818 0.23278 2.7 0.007***
attw100 -2.6433 0.46937 -5.63 0***
attw133 -0.5949 0.24638 -2.41 0.016**
attw167 2.05685 0.48484 4.24 0***
tmpit 0.19563 0.04271 4.58 0***
nptdi -0.0026 0.00014 -18.31 0***
cpi99 -0.0296 0.00412 -7.2 0***
cpi98 0.02314 0.00216 10.7 0***
cpi97 -0.006 0.00409 -1.46 0.144
gdpgr97 0.05031 0.00403 12.47 0***
gdpgr98 -0.0418 0.00484 -8.62 0***
gdpgr99 0.02391 0.00415 5.76 0***
cons 0.46772 0.01611 29.04 0***
Table 7, (a) (b): Random-e¤ects GLS regression - Taxation. Group
Variable: generation; (***) signicant at 1% C.I.; (**) signicant at 5% C.I.;
(*) signicant at 10% C.I.
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